#### UNICOS/MLS – IRIX/TRIX

#### Experiences with CRAY UNICOS–MLS and sgi IRIX/TRIX

Mats S Andersson

Associate Director

National Supercomputer Centre Linköping University Sweden

msa@nsc.liu.se





- Offer supercomputing capacity and support to Swedish academic users
- Sharing supercomputer resources with Saab AB since 1983
- Consortia with Saab AB and Swedish Meteorological and Hydralogical Institue since 1996



### **NSC** history

Hardware	In operation	Security system	Shared with
CRAY-1	1983-1989		Saab AB
CRAY-XMP	1 989–1 993	UNICOS-MLS (1992-93)	Saab AB
CRAY-YMP	1 993–1 996	UNICOS-MLS	Saab AB
MasPar 1 200	1 994–1 998		
Parsytec	1 994–1 998		
CRAY-C90	1996-2000	UNICOS-MLS	Saab AB, SMHI
CRAY–T3E	1997-	UNCOS/mk-MLS	Saab AB, SMHI
PC-clusters	1999-		
sgi2400	2000-2001	IRIX/TRIX	Saab AB, SMHI
sgi3800	2001 -	IRIX/TRIX	Saab AB, SMHI



#### **Reasons for enhanced security**

Group		Requirements	
Saab	AB Military projects	Classified data – military requirements	
	Non military projects	Classified data – Industry requirements	
SMH	I	Data integrity	
NSC		Data integrity	



#### **Security models**

Between organisations

 Compartments – Categories
 No communication between
 compartments/categories
 Horizontal

Within organisations
 Sensitivity/Integrity levels
 Controlled communication between levels
 Hierarchical – Vertical




#### **Security models**

• Sensitivity Who should see this

- Writing up
- •Reading down
- Integrity Can you trust this
  - •Reading up
  - Writing down




#### Levels – Compartments



**Compartments/Categories** 



#### **Integrity – Divisions**



#### Divisions



### DAC – MAC

# Discretionary acces control – C1 / C2 Standard UNIX User driven

Mandatory access control – B1
 Sysadm/secadm driven



#### **Evaluated systems**

#### • UNICOS 8

• Evaluated 1995–03–09

•B1 Labeled Security Protection Profile

#### • IRIX/TRIX

- Evaluation in progress (SAIC)
- •*Common Criteria B1 Labeled Security Protection Profile*



### **MLS – TRIX solution**

- Dynamic allocation of CPU and primary memory resources
- Static allocation of file space (file-systems)
- Static allocation of network resources (interfaces-network addresses)

- •Much more work to configure
- More work to maintain



#### **Alternative solution**

- Hardware split of system
- •No MLS/TRIX to configure and maintain

- •Less dynamic more hardware to get same throughput
- •Needs hands on every time you move the border



#### **Labeled objects**

- Users
- Processes
- Files/file systems
- Network interfaces / addresses



#### What to configure

• User accounts

•Label

• Capability – what is a user alloved to do

• Clearance – what compartments/categories can the user join

• File systems

•Label


• Multi-level filesystems (/tmp, /spool .....)

Network interfaces/addresses

•Label



#### **Ideal network configuration**



#### **User view**

## • User should see as little as possible of the security system

- •Normal view within their own compartment/category
- Do not see other other groups processes
- Can see other groups batch-jobs
- Some tools may be missing



### Sysadm view

- More work
- Much more work in
  - •Account administration
  - Network administration

Be very careful! Easy to make the system very secure!



### **Auditing – Monitoring**

- Without auditing no security
- Select the level of auditing carefully
- Tools will not always work the way you are used to
- Remote monitoring can be very difficult



### Batch – HSM

#### Batch system

- •NQE LSF
  - "Common" queues for all users
  - Batch administrator can see jobs but not the data
- HSM
  - DMF
    - Security information on tape ?
    - Few TRIX/DMF installations



- Select security model very carefully
   Much harder to change when in operation
- Be sure the support/consultant understand your environment and your requirements
- Doublecheck !





- Setup a test procedure to verity the configuration
   Produce a test protocol
- Should be rerun after upgrades



### Upgrade

- Upgrade procedures takes more time often less tested
- Check "protection" of optional/third party software
- Verify security setup after upgrade
- Verify functionality after upgrade



### **Summary**

- Describe your environment and your requirements
- Select security model to use
- Doublecheck support/consultants view
- •Allocate much more time for system confiration and testing
- Allocate more time to do sysadm jobs
- Lack of training
- •Sparse documentation
- Lack of MLS/TRIXified tools

